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As it is well known, Kant divided the domain of philosophical inquiry into 
three questions: What can I know? What ought I to do? What may I hope? 
The latter question, the question that constitutes the core of philosophy of 
religion, is orientated towards acquiring rational justification for what to 
believe. However, this kind of questioning is not a straightforward quest 
for truth and knowledge, but is meant instead as a way to provide a broad 
rational framework for various conceivable answers to questions regarding 
religious hope. Thus, we should not expect from philosophy of religion to 
provide us with the one and only rational answer. Instead, philosophy of re-
ligion takes on a more preliminary task of investigating the rational grounds 
for any religious hope.
A classic theistic hope, which is intrinsically linked with the expectance 
of the afterlife, is the hope for an immortal soul. However, based on previous 
considerations, the role of philosophy of religion is not so much to argue for 
or against the existence of an immortal soul, but rather to decide on the ra-
tional justification for the underlying human hope by way of elaborating on 
its conceivable significance for human life. In this light, the following ques-
tion turns out to be of crucial importance: what may we actually rationally 
want, when we say that we don’t want to die?
My first suggestion is that a conceivable answer should meet two con-
straints. (1) A naturalistic constraint: Our philosophical answer should not 
be rooted in a “supernaturalist” belief, that is, in a metaphysical view on 
the transcendent origin of nature. That is to say, we should try to construe 
the survival of death within the framework of the so–called “religious natu-
ralism”, destined to be compatible with modern natural sciences, an idea 
recently developed by Mark Johnston in his book Surviving Death (Johnston 
2010). (2) An existentialist constraint: Our philosophical answer should be 
responsive to the modern predominance of immanent self–concern bound 
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to human finiteness. As pointed out by Hans Jonas, this constraint includes 
that we willingly throw ourselves “into the waters of mortality” (Jonas 1962, 
6), and that, for the most part, we are not inclined to live on, let alone to live 
forever. So, in “modern temper”, the wish to survive one’s death becomes, 
in the eyes of the many, a strange, even obscene, desire of the few. Both con-
straints, the naturalistic and the existentialist, require that we don’t conceive 
of personal afterlife in terms of an immortal substantial soul or a pure spirit 
detached from the human body, since there is no room in scientific and exis-
tential insights for personal life that allegedly dwells beyond organic bodies.
Given these constraints, the conclusion seems prima facie overwhelm-
ingly simple: We are rationally not permitted to wish for an afterlife. How-
ever, in what follows, I will try to avoid this hasty conclusion by presenting 
two general philosophical attempts for allowing the rational acceptance of 
afterlife, the first one allowing for a personal bodily afterlife without any 
reference to a substantial soul, the second one allowing for an anonymous 
spiritual afterlife, but without any reference to a personal afterlife at all.
1.  A desire to live on: Posthumanist and moralist
 conceptions of personal bodily afterlife
To begin with, we should consider the fact that human beings seem to have 
a natural desire to live on endlessly. This natural desire is a consequence 
of what is called the deprivation theory of death and what we may also call 
the common sense view on all matters related to death. Namely, we all tend 
to think of death as a bad thing, because we understand it as a loss of life, 
as a deprivation of existential possibilities (cf. Nagel 1979). Death is a mis-
fortune, simply because we lose something by dying, namely some possi-
bilities of personal life. But note that this commonsensical view on death 
is connected with a particular view on life. In my experience of life, I seem 
to be confronted with “an essentially open–ended possible future”, which 
doesn’t reveal any built–in natural limit, for “there is no limit to the amount 
of life that it would be good to have” (Nagel 1979, 10). Thus, life is basically 
conceived of as an ascending linear process, which doesn’t strive for closure, 
but for continuation; as an immanently endless process, which gets brutally 
interrupted by an exogenous catastrophe, by the event of death.
This view on life, as a linear process of self–continuation, which is not 
internally related to death, gives rise to various technological, mostly sci-
ence–fiction, programs for realizing the personal bodily afterlife. Some ad-
vocates of those human enhancement technologies, like Nick Bostrum, call 
themselves transhumanists. Their vision of salvation is that “such enhance-
ments may make us, or our descendants, ‘posthuman’, beings who may have 
indefinite health–spans, much greater intellectual faculties than any cur-
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rent human being — and perhaps entirely new sensibilities or modalities 
— as well as the ability to control their own emotions” (Bostrum 2005). The 
crypto–religious core of the transhumanist movement is that it is stimulated 
by the idea that life might be immortalized by technological means, thereby 
inducing a posthuman afterlife. Accordingly, transhumanists essentially un-
derstand personal life as something that could be freed from the basic bio-
logical limits of the human condition, such as the limitation of the human 
lifespan by aging and death (cf. Bostrum 2003).
Later on I purport to show what is essentially wrong with this picture of 
life and death founding a technologically supported personal afterlife. But 
for the moment, let us give transhumanism some credit by provisionally 
granting the viability of its project, so that we may ask ourselves: What do 
we gain by “exploring the posthuman realm” (Bostrum 2003) in a posthu-
man afterlife? I suggest that the answer turns out to be: More of the same. 
Namely, contrary to what Bostrum seems to believe, the realization of post-
human afterlife doesn’t open up the other world, qualitatively different from 
ours (what we may call “heaven”), but the same world that we live in today, 
which, although quantitatively enhanced, still reveals the same “large–scale 
structural defects” (Johnston 2010, 17) of human life. On a similar note, 
Johnston argues that “cryonics and the like are not the sort of things that 
could even begin to address the threat of death to the importance of good-
ness” (Johnston 2010, 13).
According to Johnston, death is a “large–scale structural defect”, because 
it threatens our on–going capacity for advocating what is morally good: In 
the face of death, we tend to lose all confidence in the importance of good-
ness and become desperate. Given this diagnosis, Johnston intends to dem-
onstrate how we can conceive of a kind of personal afterlife that supports 
the importance of goodness without violating any laws of natural science. 
We have already seen that the transhumanist outlook on the afterlife doesn’t 
meet this essential condition, because the hidden incentive of the transhu-
manist project is not the importance of the good, but simply the natural ten-
dency to live on indefinitely. Put differently, transhumanism doesn’t reveal 
any serious rational motive for truly wanting an afterlife, since everything 
that transhumanists imagine might already be accomplished in the course of 
our lifetime (generating new thoughts or new feelings, controlling emotions, 
etc.). Thus, their fantasies of self–improvement are not a sufficient ground 
for being rationally justified in wanting an afterlife. 
However, and as already noted, there exists a more promising justifi-
cation for conceiving of a personal afterlife: following Johnston and Kant, 
one might turn to the implications of the importance of the good, which 
is threatened by death. We may think, for instance, of all the past social 
injustices in the history of human life, which were eternalized and sealed 
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by death. In the face of all of this innocent suffering and dying, we eas-
ily become morally discouraged: to follow moral obligation in this world 
seems amounting to an existential absurdity. For this reason, Kant postulates 
personal afterlife, since “[m]orality implies a natural promise: otherwise it 
could not impose any obligation upon us. We owe obedience only to those 
who can protect us. Morality only cannot protect us.” (Kant 1981, 82) Ac-
cording to Kant, we may rationally hope for a personal afterlife so as to see 
morality gaining power over life as a whole. Following Kant on this point, 
Johnston spells out this promise of survival implied in morality, but in a 
thoroughly naturalistic non–dualistic way, that is, without any reference to 
the existence of a substantial soul.
In Johnston’s sophisticated account, the crucial point is revealed through 
a critical reflection on the status of our selves. Consider the following self–
reflection that every one of us can perform on one’s own. I am immediately 
given to myself as being here, at the center of my “arena of presence”, in 
which the world appears to me. Being a self thus fundamentally means be-
ing an arena of presence. With some reference to the Buddhist anatta–doc-
trine, Johnston argues that this arena of presence is owned by no–one. Put 
differently, there is no persisting self across time, because there are no defin-
able conditions of identity for the arena of presence that I currently enact. 
For this reason, I simply cannot tell that my arena of presence will ever come 
to an end, which implies “the impossibility of my own death” (Johnston 
2010, 126). But our deathlessness is only the flip side of being “creatures of 
the unreal”, which are in the final analysis not worth caring for (cf. Johnston 
2010, 225, 234).
However, this is not to say that there are no persons. For, according to 
Johnston, the denial of persisting selves opens up the room for an alternative 
and radically revisionary understanding of personal identity, with an explic-
itly Protean character: We as persons are not persisting selves, but depend 
on the various scope of our future–directed concerns, on our practical dis-
position for self–identification. We may restrict our self–identification ego-
centrically to the human organisms, which arbitrarily appear at the center of 
our arenas of presence; from this ordinary disposition, it follows that we will 
personally die as soon as our respective bodies die. But we may also enlarge 
our personal identity by means of self–identification with all present and fu-
ture human organisms and individual personalities around the world; then, 
we will personally live on in other human embodiments, whenever this par-
ticular human organism, currently at the center of the respective arena of 
presence, dies off. This is precisely the path of agape followed by morally 
good people, namely “the command to treat oneself as if one were an arbi-
trary other” (Johnston 2010, 236). To sum up, the importance of goodness 
is not threatened by death, because, for a morally good person, the death of 
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an individual personality currently at the center of her respective arena of 
presence is not a great loss — she might even feel that she lives on in other 
individual personalities. The “Religion of humanity”, according to Johnston, 
can be summed up by such a “living on in the onward rush of humanity” 
(Johnston 2010, 331).
But, again, we should ask ourselves: what do we gain by such a so-
phisticated account of a morally–grounded personal afterlife? There is a cer-
tain dilemma at play. On the one hand, this revisionary view of personality 
seems to be so far removed from what we daily experience as our personal 
life that it is difficult to see why we may still call it an account of personal-
ity and personal survival — we feel that it is too little concerned with our 
personalities. But, on the other hand, if, as a reply, one wishes to stress the 
point that the practice of agape does indeed imply some kind of personal 
afterlife, than we feel that the present account is too much concerned with 
our personalities, for we feel that the importance of goodness doesn’t really 
rely on our personal fate, but on the fate of humanity as a whole, unrelated 
to my disposition to personal identification — a point recently elaborated 
by Samuel Scheffler in his book Death and the Afterlife (2013), in which the 
author reflects on a doomsday scenario similar to the infertility scenario of 
the novel/film Children of Men: 
“[…] there are many projects and activities whose importance to us is not di-
minished by the prospect of our own deaths but would be diminished by the 
prospect that everyone else will soon die. So if by the afterlife we mean the 
continuation of human life on earth after our own deaths, then it seems difficult 
to avoid the conclusion that, in some significant respects, the existence of the 
afterlife matters more to us than our own continued existence. It matters more to 
us because it is a condition of other things mattering to us. Without confidence 
in the existence of the afterlife, many of the things in our own lives that now 
matter to us would cease to do so or would come to matter less.” (Scheffler 2013, 
26; my emphasis)
In other words, we can discover that our own death or survival doesn’t re-
ally have serious implications for the fate of goodness and other matters pertain-
ing to value. In this sense, the point of view adopted by Johnston still reveals 
some egocentric bias. Without any reference to Johnston, Scheffler concludes:
“In certain concrete functional and motivational respects, the fact that we and 
everyone we love will cease to exist matters less to us than would the nonexist-
ence of future people whom we do not know and who, indeed, have no determi-
nate identities. Or to put it more positively, the coming into existence of people 
we do not know and love matters more to us than our own survival and the sur-
vival of the people we do know and love. Even allowing for the likelihood that 
some portion of our concern for these future people is a concern for the survival 
of particular groups with which we specially identify, this is a remarkable fact 
which should get more attention than it does in thinking about the nature and 
limits of our personal egoism.” (Scheffler 2013, 45)
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Considerations such as these are also supported by Hans Jonas, who 
argues against any “moral claim” to a personal afterlife (Jonas 1962, 18), 
and by Max Scheler, who points to the replaceability of any individual with 
regard to the fulfillment of the moral task (Scheler 1957, 56).
2.  Happily dying off: The dialectic of personal life and the
 impersonal spiritual afterlife
Let us now turn to the previously announced critical review of the picture of 
life as an endless linear process interrupted by the event of death. This criti-
cism applies not only to the idea of posthumanist personal afterlife treated 
earlier, but also to the morally–grounded personal afterlife, as elaborated 
by Johnston. The crucial point to understand is that all organic life, but 
especially personal life,1 is not only empirically, but essentially temporally 
limited. Put differently, I argue that death is not an exogenous event, but an 
a priori of life. The argument comes in three versions,
(1) the version based on the temporal structure of lived–experience 
(Scheler 1957),
(2) the version based on the relation between character and categorical 
desire (Williams 1973), and
(3) the version based on the relation between value–laden life and tem-
poral scarcity (Scheffler 2013).
(1) The most basic justification of the a priori of death stems from the analy-
sis of the temporal structure of lived–experience. According to Scheler, the 
(retentional) impact of passed lived–experiences is such that the “life already 
lived (gelebtes Leben)” is steadily growing, thereby effecting a proportional 
shrinkage of the “life to live (zu lebendes Leben)”, which is yet to come (cf. 
Scheler 1957, 18pp.). Thus, the line followed by the process of life is not lin-
ear, but curved (cf. Plessner 1975, 146). In this respect, death is structurally 
already present in the course of my temporal consciousness. Its presence 
manifests itself in my experience of a change in direction from ascending to 
descending life, which for the first time reveals that my future is fading. In 
the process of living towards my “natural death”, life thus manifests itself as 
a “closed totality (geschlossene Totalität)” (Scheler 1957, 23).
1 A psychophysically neutral account of life might even show that all processes of organic 
life follow a priori a curved line, hereby preparing the exogenous event of death. In this 
sense, Plessner’s intention is to mediate between empiricist and a priori theories of death 
by introducing the notion of Schicksalsformen des Lebens („life’s forms of destiny“): “Noch 
ist eine dritte [Möglichkeit] offen: der Tod ist dem Leben unmittelbar äußerlich und un-
wesentlich, wird jedoch durch die lebensweltliche Form der Entwicklung mittelbar zum 
unbedingten Schicksal des Lebens.“ (1975, 148; my emphasis)
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(2) In another version, established by Bernard Williams, it is shown that 
immortality, or any “excessively long life” (Scheffler 2013, 91), would inevi-
tably lead to a “tedious” state for the human being, because the meaning of 
human life is the formation of a particular character driven by certain “cat-
egorical desires” in response to the world. Death, as a constitutive moment 
of the meaning of life, is thus the seal of the completion of this particular 
formation process, which animates a personal life. In the words of Williams: 
“[…] I am going to suggest that the supposed contingencies are not really 
contingencies; that an endless life would be a meaningless one; and that we 
could have no reason for living eternally a human life. There is no desir-
able or significant property which life would have more of, or have more 
unqualifiedly, if we lasted for ever.” (Williams 1973, 89) This consideration 
gives rise to a particular dialectical conception of human life, to which I will 
turn in an instant.
(3) Finally, Scheffler points out that the eternal life would be no intelligible 
personal life at all, for it would call into question “the conditions under 
which the attitude of valuing comes to play an important role in human life” 
(Scheffler 2013, 99). More specifically, human goals, challenges, and satis-
factions, depend on a life as a “progression of stages” (ibid. 96), which opens 
up a temporally bounded play of human activity. For example, we cannot 
conceive of a truly human decision unless under the condition of temporal 
scarcity. Scheffler therefore concludes:
“A life without temporal boundaries would no more be a life than a circle with-
out a circumference would be a circle. So whatever the eternal existence of a be-
ing might be like, it would not be just like our lives only more so. The statement 
that death is essential to our concept of a life is not merely a trivial truth resting 
on a stipulative definition of ‘life.’ It is a substantive observation which reminds 
us that the aspects of life that we cherish most dearly—love and labor, intimacy 
and achievement, creativity and humor and solidarity and all the rest—all have 
the status of values for us because of their role in our finite and bounded lives.” 
(Scheffler 2013, 100)
The main point seems to be that it is not our own personal death that 
threatens the meaning of life, but, first, the death of the others, and second, 
my own deathlessness: “what is necessary to sustain our confidence in our 
values is that we should die and that others should live” (ibid. 108). We can 
take this as a concluding remark for all philosophical matters on personal 
afterlife: we are not rationally justified to want a personal afterlife, for the 
dynamic of personal life is such that it doesn’t tolerate any substantial im-
mortalization.
We should also keep hold of the most general result behind this, namely, 
the basic dialectic of human life leading straight to the particular dilemma 
of any idea of personal afterlife. On the one hand, to live is essentially to 
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strive for the life yet to come or to transcend the life already lived. This is the 
crucial point of what Scheffler calls the paradox of life: „The real problem is 
that one’s reasons to live are, in a sense, reasons not to live as oneself. It is 
I who wants to live, but I want to live by losing myself — by not being me. 
That is the paradox or puzzle that, if Williams is correct, lies at the heart of 
human experience, and rather than being a consequence of immortality, it is 
always with us mortals.“ (Scheffler 2013, 95) Put differently, vitality is not 
self–preservation, but exteriorization by concern for the world. But, on the 
other hand, if there were no self to preserve, there would not be any striving 
for a life yet to come. For this reason, life is not only self–transcendence, but 
also interiorization, a process that we can observe in the formation of a per-
sonal character. A flourishing personal life encompasses both movements at 
the same time: ever regaining oneself by ever losing oneself. This dialectic of 
personal life necessarily comes to an end, because it is no formal zero–sum 
game, but a progressive process of maturing that leads to a definite result 
(ideally, by climbing to an Aristotelian “acme”), to a personal character fi-
nally sealed by aging and natural death. It follows that, those who complain 
about mortality as such, don’t understand what life is.
This dialectic of personal life brings about a particular epistemic dilem-
ma about any idea of personal afterlife. The dilemma consists in the follow-
ing: Either we conceive of the afterlife based on our familiarity with life in 
this world, as we should2 — but then this idea becomes meaningless, as we 
have just seen in respect to life’s entanglement with death; or we conceive of 
afterlife as something totally strange and unfamiliar to our previous experi-
ence with life (e.g., as a visio beatifica eternally contemplating the greatness 
of God) — but then this idea loses all its intelligibility for us, thus turning 
the idea of afterlife into a random fantasy and making impossible any ra-
tional hope. Scheffler expresses the same doubt: “Problems such as these put 
pressure on us to move, as many have in any case wanted to move, toward 
a reconceptualization of immortality as involving a kind of noncorporeal ex-
istence which would be sufficiently unlike ordinary life on earth as to side-
step these issues. But to suspend in this way all the constraints imposed by 
2 As Scheler rightly points out, questions of afterlife should be kept in continuity with ques-
tions of our present state of lived–experience, or „Fortleben“ should follow „Erleben“: „Die 
Art unserer Problemstellung zeigt, daß auf alle Fälle die Frage des Fortlebens nach dem 
Tode ganz und gar abhängig ist von einer Reihe Fragen unseres Er–lebens während unseres 
Lebens. Niemand kann anders fortleben, als er schon derzeit — lebt, oder schärfer: sein 
Leben und das, was in ihm sich vor ihm auftut, er–lebt. Ich finde nichts verwunderlicher, 
als es die Art ist, wie man gemeinhin diese große Frage behandelt; ich finde kaum einen 
Ausdruck für dies Verwunderliche. Man scheint zu meinen, es könne der Tod — gleich-
gültig, ob es ein Fort–leben gibt oder nicht — irgendein Gesetz zur Aufhebung bringen, das 
schon während des Lebens waltet: so, als ob der Tod einfach das große Wunder wäre, nach 
dem eben ‚alles anders ist‘.“ (Scheler 1957, 61)
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our biology — by our nature as organisms — is to make it even clearer that 
we are no longer thinking of a human life in any recognizable sense at all.“ 
(Scheffler 2013, 98) Either meaningless or unintelligible: both consequences 
are ruinous for our idea of personal afterlife.3
In my final part, I want to suggest a way out of the dilemma. My solu-
tion is based on the observation that the dialectical “regaining by losing” 
personal life already gives a hint that afterlife might not be bound to matters 
of personal survival, insofar as losing one’s personality is essentially part 
of what constitutes life as a process. In other words, personal life is always 
already traversed by a movement of transcending personal life.4 With this in 
mind, my suggestion is that an impersonal or anonymous spiritual afterlife 
might be conceptualized in an intelligible way. There are at least two viable 
(and, in the final analysis, related) conceptions of an anonymous afterlife, 
which remain within naturalistic and existentialist constraints,
(1) the afterlife by way of the “eternity of the spirit” (Scheler 1957, 38),5
(2) the afterlife by way of the “immortality of deeds” (Jonas 1962, 10).
(1) To speak of the eternity of the spirit is not necessarily a metaphysical 
supposition, for we experience eternity whenever we perform mental acts 
intending timeless unities of sense, which transcend our temporal condi-
tion. In this sense, the idea of the eternity of the spirit is not an intellectualist 
bias towards an afterlife, insofar as living a full personal life always implies 
developing and incorporating “matters/complexions of sense (Sinnzusam-
menhänge)”, which, although articulated in the process of life, are essen-
tially independent from it (Scheler 1957, 40). Take, for instance, friendship: 
if I died an untimely death in a car accident, this would not be the end of my 
friendship to my closest friends, because death (different from betrayal) is 
3 According to Schleiermacher, we might even argue that the desire for a personal afterlife 
is irreligious: „Erinnert Euch, wie in ihr religion alles darauf hinstrebt, daß die scharf ab-
geschnittenen Umrisse unserer Persönlichkeit sich erweitern und sich allmählich verlieren 
sollen ins Unendliche, daß wir durch das Anschauen des Universums soviel als möglich 
eins werden sollen mit ihm; sie most people aber sträuben sich gegen das Unendliche, 
sie wollen nicht hinaus, sie wollen nichts sein als sie selbst und sind ängstlich besorgt um 
ihre Individualität.“ (Schleiermacher 1969, 87; my emphasis)
4 Compare, for instance, the citation of Schleiermacher in Fn. 3. Furthermore, the dictum of 
Lorenzo de Medici as mentioned by Goethe could be interpreted in a similar vein: Those 
who have no hope for another life, are already dead for this life: „[...] ich möchte mit Lor-
enzo de Medici sagen, daß alle diejenigen auch für dieses Leben tot sind, die kein anderes 
hoffen [...]“ (cited by Scheler 1957, 51). 
5 Scheler also establishes an interesting and detailed phenomenological account of personal 
afterlife (Scheler 1957, 41pp.); but it can be shown that his account turns out to be depend-
ent on the highly questionable assumption that Leib (“lived body”) and Körper (“living 
body”) are essentially independent from each other, so that a person is not essentially its 
living body (although it essentially has its living body, as Scheler concedes).
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for those who survive not a justifiable reason to end a friendship. Therefore, 
I may trust that our friendship as a more–than–personal or even impersonal 
matter of meaning will live on after my personal death (cf. Scheler 1957, 41). 
Note that this conception doesn’t simply refer to the famous “immortality of 
name” (Jonas 1962, 3) or the related “immortality of influence” (ibid. 4), but 
instead relies on the fact that personal life is open to incorporate impersonal 
universal meaning.
(2) The conception of the “immortality of deeds” focuses on the imper-
sonal importance of our “moments of decision, when our whole being is 
involved” (Jonas 1962, 7) and when “we feel as if acting under the eyes of 
eternity” (ibid.).6 Jonas resumes two traditional metaphors to articulate the 
metaphysical setting of this feeling of eternity: We may feel that our deeds 
were registered in the “Book of Life”, so that “deeds inscribe themselves in an 
eternal memoir of time” (Jonas 1962, 10). Alternatively, in a more panenthe-
ist vein, we may feel that we are responsible for God’s ownmost “adventure 
in mortality” (ibid. 15), that is, the “self–forfeiture of divine integrity for the 
sake of unprejudiced becoming” (ibid. 14) — then our deeds count as our 
personal contribution to the immanent reconstitution of the broken trans-
cendent image of God, a process which is the ultimate meaning of the exist-
ence of the world and the evolution of life. In this sense, our deeds are our 
share in God’s immortal image: “[…] in this awesome impact of his deeds on 
God’s destiny, on the very complexion of eternal being, lies the immortality 
of man” (Jonas 1962, 16). More precisely, the human person is not immortal 
in itself, but is the “mortal trustee of an immortal cause” (ibid. 17).
Where does this leave us? The reader will recall the starting point of John-
ston’s philosophical effort to rationally grant personal survival: the importance 
of goodness threatened by death. It now appears that the importance of good-
ness and other values is not saved by our personal afterlife, but by our per-
sonal devotion to an impersonal immortal cause, be it the more–than–personal 
matters of sense that we are able to incorporate in our temporally bounded 
lives, or be it the image of God that we help reconstituting by our deeds.
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Abstract
ON WHAT WE WANT, WHEN WE SAY THA T WE DON’T 
WANT TO DIE
A classic theistic hope, which is intrinsically linked with the expectance of the 
afterlife, is the hope for an immortal soul. However, the role of philosophy of 
religion is not so much to argue for or against the existence of an immortal soul, 
but rather to decide on the rational justification for the underlying human hope 
by way of elaborating on its conceivable significance for human life. In this 
light, the question arises, what we may actually rationally want, when we say 
that we don’t want to die. Two general philosophical attempts for allowing the 
rational expectance of an afterlife are presented, the first one allowing for a per-
sonal bodily afterlife without reference to a substantial soul, the second one al-
lowing for an anonymous spiritual afterlife without reference to a personal after-
life. Considering personal bodily afterlife, I critically discuss the transhumanist 
conception of life as a linear process of self–continuation not internally related 
to death, as well as a moralist foundation for a personal survival in the face of 
the importance of goodness threatened by death. The subsequent sketch of the 
dialectic of personal life intends to establish, first, that personal life is essentially 
temporally limited (death is an a priori of life), and secondly, that the idea of a 
personal afterlife is burdened by an epistemic dilemma, insofar as it reveals to 
be either meaningless or unintelligible. To resolve this dilemma, a conception of 
an intelligible impersonal afterlife is introduced, which is based on the existen-
tial devotion to an impersonal immortal cause.
KEY WORDS: afterlife, death, dialectic of life, finiteness, Hans Jonas, immortality, 
life, Max Scheler. 
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